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Abstract:   This paper investigates empirically how labor market institutions affect wage and inflation 
dynamics, particularly the volatility of real wage growth and inflation using a panel data 
for OECD economies. I also look at how the rate of unemployment is affected by the 
larger set of labor market variables that captures diverse aspects of the labor market. The 
main finding of the paper is that benefit replacement rate is the most significant variable 
in explaining the volatility of real wage growth and inflation. Besides that union density 
and bargaining coordination also play an important role in explaining the volatilities 
in these variables. These results for the benefit replacement rate and union density also 
support the findings of the theoretical models. It is also shown that the labor market 
institutions have a considerable influence on the level of unemployment as higher levels 
of benefit replacement rate, longer durations of unemployment benefits, and a higher 
union density are expected to lead to a higher level of unemployment.
I. InTrODuCTIOn
The structure of labor markets has recently gained attention in traditional new Keynesian 
models in the form of search and matching frictions in the labor market a la Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994). Christoffer and Linzert (2005), Gertler and Trigari (2006), Trigari (2006) 
and Krause and Lubik (2005) are some recent examples of this modelling strategy. These 
models have been quite useful in matching the business cycle dynamics. In a theoretical model 
setting these models have shown that the way the labor markets and wage setting mechanism 
is modelled significantly affects the wage and inflation dynamics. Gertler, Sala, and Trigari 
(2007) find that incorporating staggered wage contracting is important in these models in terms 
of achieving the relatively smooth behavior of wages. Macit (2007) has shown that allowing 
for on-the-job search mechanism plays the same role and helps one in obtaining the observed 
volatility in wages. The models have also shown that the calibration of the parameters for 
the labor market which can be proxied by various labor market institutions in the data affect 
the response of wages and inflation to exogenous shocks. Trigari (2006) finds that a higher ThE rolE of lAbor mArkET insTiTuTions on WAgE And inflATion dynAmics:  
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parameter value for the value of unemployment benefits along with a smaller number for the 
bargaining power parameter generates smoother responses in real wages and inflation. Macit 
(2008) incorporates a fixed firing cost into these models and finds that a higher firing cost 
reduces the volatility of inflation and real wages and generates more persistent movements in 
these variables. The findings of these papers have raised the question of whether there exists 
an empirical evidence that supports these results.
In this paper I carry out an empirical investigation of these findings using panel data for 
OECD economies for the period 1970 and 1995. In particular I explore the role of labor market 
institutions in explaining the volatility of real wage growth and inflation. As the labor market 
institutions that are used can be considered as proxies of parameters in the theoretical models 
this study will also be an empirical test of the findings of these models. In order to capture 
diverse aspects of the labor market I take various indicators of the labor market characteristics 
including employment protection legislation index, benefit replacement rate, benefit duration 
index, union density, and bargaining coordination index. I calculate the volatility in real wage 
growth and inflation for each 5-year non-overlapping intervals for the period 1970 and 1995. The 
main finding of the paper is that benefit replacement rate is the most significant labor market 
institution explaining the volatility in inflation and real wage growth. Besides that union density 
which can be taken as a proxy for the bargaining power of the workers also plays an important 
role for inflation volatility. These results are consistent with the theoretical findings of Trigari 
(2006) who shows that the value of unemployment benefits and bargaining power parameters 
are two important parameters of the model. However, the empirical evidence fails to support 
the results for the firing costs which are proxied by employment protection legislation index.
The role of labor market institutions on macroeconomic dynamics has been a topic of 
research for many economists. However, most of these studies have focused on explaining the 
level of unemployment differences across the countries based on labor market characteristics. 
Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) investigate the interaction between shocks and labor market 
institutions in explaining the cross-country differences in the rise of European unemployment. 
Fialova and Schneider (2008) explores the role of labor market institutions in explaining 
different labor market developments in European countries and they give particular attention 
to the new European union member countries. An important issue with these and other related 
papers is that they focus on a particular aspect of the labor market. In this paper I also look 
at how the level of unemployment rate is affected by labor market insitutions using the broad 
set of variables that captures diverse aspects of the labor market. A number of authors have 
also investigated the relationship between labor market institutions and inflation dynamics. 
Campolmi  and  Faia  (2006)  investigates  whether  inflation  differentials  observed  among 
European union countries can be explained by the differences in their labor market structures. 
nunziata and Bowdler (2005) carries out an empirical analysis for the impact of labor market 
structures on the response of inflation to macroeconomic shocks. rumler and Scharler (2009) 
investigates the role of labor market institutions on business cycle volatility and also analyses 
how the degree unions internalize the macroeconomic consequences of their actions affect 
inflation volatility. This paper differs from their paper as I use a larger set of labor market 
institutions and focus on the volatility of real wage growth and inflation persistence besides 
the volatility in inflation.fATih mAciT
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the empirical model and 
gives a description of the data. Section III discusses the estimation results and Section IV 
concludes.
II. EMPIrICAL MODEL AnD DATA
2.1 Empirical Model
This section presents the econometric model that I use to investigate the relationship between 
labor market institutions and volatility of real wage growth and inflation. I also present 
the estimation results regarding the relationship between the labor market institutions and 
unemployment rate by regressing the unemployment rate on a set of labor market institutions. 
For the purpose of the relationship between the labor market institutions and the volatility of 
real wage growth and inflation I regress the standard deviations of the real wage growth and 
inflation on various indicators for labor market institutions and a set of control variables. The 




where σ(πit) denotes the volatility of inflation and σ(wit) denotes the volatility of real wage 
growth for country i  calculated over the 5-year non-overlapping time interval t . LMIit is a 
vector of variables including labor market institutions and Xj,it represent the vector of control 
variables. λi denotes the country fixed effects and uit represents the average unemployment 
rate for country i  over the time interval t . I estimate equations (1) through (3) in a single 
equation framework using fixed effects estimators.
The vector LMIit contains the variables for labor market institutions including an index 
measuring the strictness of the employment protection legislation, EPLit, a proxy measuring 
the level of unemployment benefits namely benefit replacement rate, Brrit, benefit duration 
index, BDit, union density, uDit, and an index capturing the level of coordination between 
workers and firms during the wage bargaining process, COit.
EPLit  which  measures  the  strictness  of  the  employment  protection  legislation  is  an 
index that captures the features of the labor market such as difficulty of dismissal, notice of 
dismissal, severance pay etc. Although the data for employment protection legislation index 
is taken from nickell and nunziata (2001) the ultimate data source is employment outlooks 
of OECD. The index takes a value between 0 and 2 and a higher index number implies that 
there are stricter employment protection legislations in that country. A stricter employment 
protection legislation implies that dismissal of a worker is difficult and costly for a firm which 
should dampen the volatility of the real wages and inflation and generate more persistence 
movements in these variables.
The benefit replacement rate, Brrit, measures the level of unemployment benefits as a 
percentage of average earnings before tax. nickell and nunziata (2001) takes the first year of ThE rolE of lAbor mArkET insTiTuTions on WAgE And inflATion dynAmics:  
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unemployment benefits when calculating the benefit replacement rate. For instance, for Germany 
the average index value for Brr for the years between 1970 and 1995 is 0.39 which means 
that when unemployed a German worker earns 39 percent of his last wage when employed. 
The benefit duration index, BDit, is a measure of how long the unemployment benefits last 
for. nickell and nunziata (2001) calculate the BD using the following formula:
  (4)
where BBR1 is the unemployment benefit replacement rate received during the first year of 
unemployment, BBR2 is the benefit replacement rate that prevails during the second and third 
year of unemployment, and BBR4 is the replacement rate received during the fourth and fifth 
year of unemployment. nickell and nunziata (2001) give more weight to the first part of the 
formula as they set α = 0.6. If workers are not entitled for unemployment benefits after one 
year then one has BRR2 – BRR4 – 0 which gives us BD = 0. If workers receive the same benefit 
during the course of unemployment then one gets BBR1 = BBR2 = BBR4 which makes BD = 
1. A higher value for Brr and/or BD means that workers have a higher reservation wage. 
That is workers do not have an incentive for extensive wage cuts during bad times as they 
have relatively better outside options which dampens the volatility of real wages and inflation.
union density, uDit, is measured as the ratio of total reported union members (gross minus 
retired and unemployed members) to wage and salaried employees. A high unionization rate 
means a strong bargaining power for workers which can make wages more volatile.
The bargaining coordination index, COit, measures the level of coordination between firms 
and workers during the wage bargaining process. The index takes a value between 1 and 3 
higher numbers implying a more coordinated wage bargaining process. nickell and nunziata 
(2001) define COWit as an alternative proxy for the level of coordination. The only difference 
is that COW measures the short term variation in coordination. The literature considers the 
bargaining coordination index as an indicator of the degree to which unions internalize the 
macroeconomic consequences of their wage claims. Therefore, for countries that have highly 
coordinated bargaining processes one should expect the volatility of real wage growth and 
inflation to be low as unions are assumed to internalize the macroeconomic consequences of 
their wage claims.
The vector of control variables X1,it given in equation (1) comprises the volatilities of 
money growth rate, import price inflation, and total labor productivity growth. The inclusion 
of import price inflation as a control variable for inflation volatility is motivated by the work 
of rumler (2007) and Leith and Mulley (2007) as they show that import prices may influence 
inflation in open economies. For equation (2) X2,it includes the volatility of the labor productivity 
growth of the total economy.
2.2 Data Description
The sample that I use includes data from 20 OECD countries namely Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, netherlands, 
new Zealand, norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, united Kingdom, and the 
united States. The labor market institutions data are taken from nickell and nunziata (2001) fATih mAciT
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which is yearly data for the period 1960 and 1995. The data for inflation, labor productivity 
growth, and real wages is obtained from OECD Economic Outlook database. The real wages 
are obtained by dividing hourly earnings for manufacturing sector by the consumer price index 
for the respective period. The data for inflation and real wages is a quarterly data for the period 
1970 and 2000. The numbers for money growth and import price inflation are obtained from 
International Financial Statistics database of IMF. I calculate the standard deviations over 5-year 
intervals. As the labor market institutions data end in 1995 and the data for macroeconomic 
variables start from 1970 the panel data set includes 6 observations in the time dimension and 
20 observations in the cross-sectional dimension.
A summary of the labor market institutions is given in Table 1. The table gives the average 
values of employment protection legislation index, benefit replacement rate, benefit duration 
index, union density, and bargaining coordination index over the period 1970 and 1995 for 20 
OECD countries. One can observe that there is a huge cross-country variation in terms of the 
labor market characteristics of the OECD economies. For instance, for employment protection 
legislation index one can observe values as low as 0.1 (united States) and at the same time 
values as high as 1.97 (Italy). The same pattern can also be observed for other labor market 
institutions. Another question that one may raise is that if a country has a strict labor market 
regulation in terms of one institution then it is possible that the country has protective labor 
market institutions from other perspectives. For instance, one might conjecture that if a country 
has a high index number for employment protection legislation then the country might have 
more generous benefit replacement rate or a higher number for union density. If this is the 
case then our regressions might have the problem of multicollinearity. In order to check for 
this one can look at coefficients of cross-correlations for the labor market institutions that are 
included in the regression. Table 2 presents cross-correlations for the labor market variables. 
The results show that there is a very weak correlation across the labor market institutions 
which leads one not to worry about the multicollinearity problem in the regression analysis. 
For instance, the weak correlation between the level of employment protection legislation and 
benefit replacement rate or union density shows that the fact that a country has rigid rules for 
employment protection does not necessarily imply that there are more generous unemployment 
benefits or high number of workers that are attached to a labor union.
One can also claim for instance that bargaining coordination and/or union density are 
relatively high in countries which are subject to more volatile movements in inflation and 
real wages and not the other way around as it is investigated in this paper. That is one may 
conjecture that the endogenity problem may arise in the regression models. To avoid this 
problem of endogenity for the labor market institutions I use the initial values of the five 
year time intervals for which standard deviations are calculated. It is also seen in the data 
that although the value of the labor market institutions show large variations across the time 
intervals for which standard deviations are calculated there is very little variation within the 
same time interval.1
1   The results do not show a big difference when I take average values of the labor market institutions rather 
than using the initial values of the five year time intervals.ThE rolE of lAbor mArkET insTiTuTions on WAgE And inflATion dynAmics:  
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Table 1: Average values of the labor market institutions over the period of 1970-1995 
 EPL   Brr   BD   uD   CO 
Australia   0.5   0.23   1.02   0.47   2.15 
Austria   1.09   0.31   0.64   0.50   3.00 
Belgium   1.48   0.50   0.79   0.51   2.00 
Canada   0.30   0.57   0.23   0.36   1.00 
Denmark   1.03   0.60   0.71   0.74   2.40 
Finland   1.18   0.39   0.59   0.69   2.25 
France   1.26   0.58   0.34   0.16   1.85 
Germany   1.59   0.39   0.61   0.33   3.00 
Ireland   0.47   0.42   0.50   0.54   2.31 
Italy   1.97   0.10   0.04   0.44   1.63 
Japan   1.40   0.31   0.00   0.27   3.00 
netherlands   1.33   0.67   0.56   0.31   2.00 
new Zealand   0.80   0.29   1.03   0.36   1.30 
norway   1.52   0.45   0.45   0.54   2.50 
Portugal   1.79   0.46   0.18   0.49   1.88 
Spain   1.89   0.65   0.15   0.12   2.00 
Sweden   1.47   0.61   0.04   0.80   2.37 
Switzerland   0.55   0.39   0.03   0.28   2.25 
uK   0.34   0.28   0.65   0.50   1.37 
uS   0.10   0.28   0.18   0.21   1.00 
Mean   1.10   0.42   0.44   0.43   2.06 
Standard Devation   0.57   0.16   0.32   0.18   0.60
Table 2: Cross-Correlations across the labor market variables
   EPL   Brr   BD   uD   CO 
EPL   1.00   0.22   -0.25   0.04   0.43 
Brr   0.22   1.00   -0.12   0.02   0.07 
BD   -0.25   -0.12   1.00   0.26   0.02 
uD   0.04   0.02   0.26   1.00   0.25 
CO   0.43   0.07   0.02   0.25   1.00 
III. ESTIMATIOn rESuLTS
3.1 Results
Table 3 shows the results for the regression given in equation (1) that takes the volatility of 
inflation as the dependent variable. The table includes two different specifications. In the first 
column as a measure of coordination between workers and firms during the wage bargaining 
process COit is used whereas in the second column a different proxy for coordination namely 
COWit is used. As nickell and nunziata (2001) defines the difference between the two indiciators 
is that COWit contains the short term variation in bargaining coordination.fATih mAciT
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Table 3: Estimation results for the Volatility of Inflation
σ(MS)  0.011   0.007 
σ(IMP)  0.040***    0.038***
σ(PROD)   0.107*   0.092 
EPL   0.276   0.264 
Brr   -0.871**  -0.841**
BD   -0.479   -0.443 
uD   1.580**  1.511** 
CO   -0.085   
COW     0.240**
r2  0.64   0.66
notes: In terms of the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates * denotes the significance at 10% level, 
** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The regression also includes 
dummy variables for each country to represent the fixed country effects but they are not reported here.
Before getting into the evaluation of the results it will be useful to check whether labor 
market institutions overall play a role in explaining the variation in inflation volatility. In order 
to test for this one can carry out a hypothesis testing by setting the null hypothesis as β⁅
1 = 0 
in equation (1). That is I will test whether all the coefficients for the labor market insitutions 
are equal to zero which implies that labor market characteristics play no role for explaining 
inflation volatility. The test can be done by using an F-test with the following test statistics:
  (5)
where J is the number of restrictions and K is the number of parameters in the unrestricted 
model. The value of the test statistics is greater than the respective critical value which leads 
us to reject the null hypothesis that claims β⁅
1 = 0.
The first column in the table shows that all the control variables that are included in the 
regression have the expected signs. One can see that a higher volatility in the growth rate of 
money supply, the import price inflation, and the productivity growth translates into a higher 
volatility in inflation. Among these variables the volatility of import price inflation, σ(IMP), 
seems to be the most significant one and the volatility of the productivity growth has also 
statistical significance. Surprisingly although it has a positive coefficient the volatility of the 
money growth, σ(MS), is not statistically significant even at 10% level. In the second column 
where I use a different proxy for coordination the results for the control variables do not change 
in terms of the sign of the estimated coefficients and their statistical significance.
I will now elaborate on the results for the labor market variables as the main interest of 
the paper is to investigate the influence of labor market institutions on inflation and wage 
dynamics. It can be seen from the first column of the table that only benefit replacement rate, 
Brr, and union density, uD, are statistically significant variables in explaining the variation 
in the volatility of inflation. The results show that in a country a higher benefit replacement 
rate leads to lower volatility in inflation and a higher union density generates more volatile 
movements in inflation. An economic interpretation of this result can be the following. If a ThE rolE of lAbor mArkET insTiTuTions on WAgE And inflATion dynAmics:  
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country has a higher benefit replacement rate that means workers have a better outside option 
when they become unemployed. As workers will not have an incentive for extensive wage 
cuts during bad times this will dampen the volatility of the wages which may in turn translate 
into lower volatility for inflation. The coefficient for benefit duration index, BD, although it is 
statistically insignificant, has a negative sign which implies that the higher the index number 
the lower the volatility of inflation. The reasoning behind this is the same as the one in benefit 
replacement rate as higher durations of unemployment benefits imply a better outside option 
for workers which dampens the volatility of wages and in turn inflation.
The positive coefficient for the union density implies that in countries where a higher 
number of workers are attached to a labor union workers have more bargaining power which 
may increase the volatility of the inflation. The other labor market institutions variable namely 
employment protection legislation does not play a significant role in explaining the variations 
in the volatility of inflation.
An important point to emphasize is that the results for the benefit replacement rate and 
union density support the theoretical findings of the new Keynesian models with search and 
matching frictions. Trigari (2006) shows that in these theoretical models a higher parameter 
value for the value of unemployment benefits generates smoother responses in inflation and 
real wages. She also shows that if the workers’ bargaining power is set at a high level that 
will increase the volatility of inflation and real wages. Here the empirical results that I present 
support these theoretical findings. The results show that a higher benefit replacement rate which 
means a higher value of unemployment decreases the volatility of inflation. As one can consider 
the union density an indicator of workers’ bargaining power the regression results show that 
a higher union density generates more volatile movements in inflation which is in line with 
the results of the theoretical model. These results are very important as they complement the 
findings of the theoretical model.
As far as the influence of bargaining coordination is concerned the two columns provide 
us different results. In the first column the bargaining coordination which is proxied by the 
variable CO is not significant in explaining the volatility of inflation. However, in the second 
column of the table where I use a proxy for coordination which measures short term variation 
in bargaining coordination the COW appears to be significant and is estimated to have a 
positive coefficient. This result is actually not consistent with the expectation that a high 
level of coordination during the wage bargaining process should lead to reduced volatility in 
inflation. A high level of coordination between firms and workers during the wage bargaining 
process implies that unions will internalize the macroeconomic consequences of their wage 
claims which will lead to reduced wage volatility and in turn reduced inflation volatility. As 
one can see from the second column the results for other labor market institutions do not 
change when COW is used as an indicator for bargaining coordination.
Table 4 shows the results for the volatility of real wage growth as given in equation (2). 
As in the case of the volatility of inflation the table includes two specifications depending on 
two different indicators for coordination. For the volatility of the real wage growth the only 
control variable that is used is the labor productivity growth of the total economy. It is seen in 
both columns of the table that the volatility of the labor poductivity growth is highly significant 
in explaining the volatility of real wage growth and as expected a higher volatility in labor 
productivity growth generates more volatile movements in real wage growth.fATih mAciT
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Table 4: Estimation results for the Volatility of real Wage Growth
σ(PROD)  0.004***  0.004***
EPL   -0.004   -0.003 
Brr   -0.013*  -0.013*
BD   -0.005   -0.004 
uD   0.011   0.013 
CO   0.001   
COW     0.006***
r    0.51   0.56
notes: In terms of the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates * denotes the significance at 10% level, 
** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The regression also includes 
dummy variables for each country to represent the fixed country effects but they are not reported here.
As I did in the case of inflation volatility it will be again informative to look at overall 
significance of the labor market institutitons before evaluating the individual results. I will 
check for the null hypothesis that sets β2 – 0 in equation (2) against the alternative that at least 
one of the parameters inside β2 is different from zero. Again I use the same test statistics as in 
(6) and the results show that the value of the test statistics is greater than the respective critical 
F-value which allows one to reject the null hypothesis which sets β2 – 0.
In terms of the influence of the labor market institutions on the volatility of real wage 
growth the benefit replacement rate appears to be highly signficant. The results show that a 
more generous unemployment benefit system generates less volatile movements in real wage 
growth. The main reasoning behind this result is that workers will not allow real wages to 
adjust extensively as they know that they have a better outside option when they become 
unemployed. This leads to smoother responses in real wages in case of shocks which leads 
to lower volatility in the growth rate of real wages. As it has also been mentioned before the 
benefit replacement rate has been an important parameter in theoretical models that incorporate 
search and matching structure in an otherwise standard new Keynesian model. Hagedorn 
and Manovskii (2006) shows that when the benefit replacement rate is set at higher levels the 
theoretical model is able to generate the relatively smooth behavior of wages over the cycle 
which the standard models fail to achieve. Here I present empirical evidence that supports 
this theoretical finding. That is the results show that in countries which have a higher benefit 
replacement rate real wage growth shows less volatility.
Although it is statistically insignificant the results show that a higher union density is 
expected to lead to a more volatile movement in real wage growth which is again in line 
with the findings of the theoretical findings. The results also show that stricter employment 
protection legislation generates less volatile real wage growth which supports the findings of 
the model developed by Macit (2008). However, none of these have a significant effect on 
the volatility of real wage growth.
In the above discussion the volatility of inflation and real wage growth is estimated in a 
single equation framework. One can also estimate the volatilities of inflation and real wage 
growth in a system of equations treating the volatility of inflation and the volatility of real 
wage growth as endogenous variables. Following rumler and Scharler (2009) when I use ThE rolE of lAbor mArkET insTiTuTions on WAgE And inflATion dynAmics:  
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three stage least squares estimation for this purpose which allows the error terms of the two 
equations to be correlated the results do not show a significant difference compared to fixed 
effects estimation. Table 5 shows the results. The benefit replacement rate is highly significant 
both for inflation volatility and the volatility of real wage growth. The union density is expected 
to lead to a higher volatility in inflation and in the growth rate of real wage. For inflation 
volatility a higher benefit duration index is estimated to generate a lower volatility in inflation.
Table 5: Estimation results for the System of Equations 
for Inflation and real Wages
  σ(π) σ(w)
σ(MS)  0.001   
σ(IMP)  0.031***  
σ(PROD)  0.157***  0.004***
EPL   0.502***  -0.004 
Brr   -0.712**  -0.012*
BD   -0.346*  -0.006 
uD   0.606   0.017 
CO   -0.036   0.001 
r2  0.64   0.52
notes: In terms of the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates,* denotes the significance at 10% level, 
** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The regression also includes 
dummy variables for each country to represent the fixed country effects but they are not reported here.
Lastly, I will investigate how the level of the unemployment rate is affected by the 
characteristics of the labor market using this large set of institutions. As it is mentioned before 
the influence of labor market institutions on the unemployment rate has been a topic of research 
for many authors. However, most of these studies have paid attention to a particular aspect of 
the labor market like union density or coordination. The importance of this analysis is that I 
will elaborate on the role of labor market characteristics for the unemployment rate from the 
perspective of a comprehensive set of labor market variables that will capture diverse aspects 
of the labor market. The results are presented in Table 6. As can be seen from the table labor 
market institutions play an important role in explaining the unemployment rate. The results 
show that if a country has a more generous unemployment benefit system and the benefits last 
for a longer period then the unemployment rate is expected to be high in that country. The same 
thing holds for union density as well. That is the unemployment rate is expected to be higher in 
countries that have a higher share of workers belonging to a labor union. All these variables are 
statistically significant in explaining the level of unemployment rate. For both specifications 
of the bargaining coordination it is seen that a high level of coordination between workers and 
firms during the wage bargaining process leads to a lower rate of unemployment. However, 
only for the second specification which measures the short term variation in coordination, 
bargaining coordination has a statistically significant impact on the unemployment rate. 
Although it is statistically insignificant, the negative sign for the coefficient of employment 
protection legislation makes sense from the perspective of economic interpretation. A high fATih mAciT
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index number for employment protection legislation implies that flows from employment to 
unemployment is low but at the same time movements from unemployment to employment is 
also low as firms hesitate to hire new employees due to the huge costs that they need to incur 
in case they need to fire them. Therefore, the net effect on the unemployment rate depends 
on which factor dominates the other. Here the results show that a highly rigid employment 
protection legislation is expected to generate lower levels of unemployment.
Table 6: Estimation results for the Level of unemployment
EPL   -0.883   -1.145 
Brr   9.425***    8.106***
BD   4.185*    3.490*
uD   9.977**  10.610**
CO   -1.192   
COW     -2.507***
r2  0.62   0.65
notes: In terms of the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates, * denotes the significance at 10% level, 
** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The regression also includes 
dummy variables for each country to represent the fixed country effects but they are not reported here.
3.2 Robustness Check
As mentioned before, the regression results reported above use fixed effects estimator. It 
will be informative to check the robustness of the results with respect to different estimation 
methods. For this purpose I report the results for random effects estimator using GLS and 
maximum likelihood estimation.
Table 7 shows the results for the volatility of inflation. Both columns of the table show 
that the control variables have the expected signs. That is increased volatilities in the growth 
rate of money supply, import price inflation, and labor productivity growth are expected to 
generate more volatile movements in inflation. As in the fixed effects estimator one can see 
that among these control variables the volatility of import price inflation and the volatility 
of the labor productivity growth are the significant ones for both specifications. As far as the 
labor market institutions are concerned the results show that for both random effects estimators 
the benefit replacement rate and union density are highly significant as in the fixed effects 
estimation. The results show that a higher benefit replacement rate leads to reduced inflation 
volatility whereas a higher union density creates increased inflation volatility confirming the 
previous results. The bargaining coordination which is found to be insignificant in the fixed 
effects appeared to be significant when I use random effects estimators and it has the expected 
negative sign. That is the more coordinated the wage bargaining process the lower will be the 
inflation volatility.ThE rolE of lAbor mArkET insTiTuTions on WAgE And inflATion dynAmics:  
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Table 7: results for the Volatility of Inflation for 
Different Estimation Methods
GLS random  
Effects
ML random  
Effects 
σ(MS)  0.013   0.014 
σ(IMP)  0.041***  0.041***
σ(PROD)  0.109**  0.108**
EPL   0.193   0.190*
Brr   -0.630**  -0.579**
BD   -0.288   -0.260 
uD   1.058***  1.007***
CO   -0.191*  -0.192**
notes: In terms of the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates, * denotes the significance at 10% level, 
** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
next I will analyze the results for the volatility of the real wage growth. Table 8 shows 
the results for two different random effects estimators. Labor productivity growth is the only 
control variable and as in the fixed effects estimator the volatility of the productivity growth 
increases the volatility in real wage growth and is highy significant for both random effects 
estimators. As it is shown before, the benefit replacement rate is the only significant variable 
affecting the volatility of real wage growth. Here the results for random effects estimators 
confirms the previous results as the benefit replacement rate is still statistically significant 
and is expected to generate lower volatility in real wage growth. The results also show that a 
stricter employment protection legislation dampens the volatility of real wage growth and a 
higher union density increases the volatility of real wage growth.
Table 8: results for the Volatility of real Wage Growth for 
Different Estimation Methods
  GLS random  
Effects 
ML random  
Effects 
σ(PROD)  0.004***  0.004***
EPL   -0.001   -0.001 
Brr   -0.001*  -0.006*
BD   -0.007   -0.007***
uD   0.005   0.006*
CO   0.003**  0.003**
notes: In terms of the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates, * denotes the significance at 10% level, 
** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. fATih mAciT
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IV. COnCLuSIOn
In this paper I empirically investigate how wage and inflation dynamics are affected by labor 
market institutions using the data for the OECD economies. I particularly look at how the 
volatility in inflation and real wage growth across the OECD countries change depending on a 
large set of labor market variables. I also analyze whether labor market institutions play a role 
in explaining the level of unemployment rate using this comprehensive set of labor market data.
The main finding of the paper is that the benefit replacement rate is the most significant 
labor market institution affecting the volatility of real wage growth and inflation. The results 
show that a higher benefit replacement rate dampens the volatility of real wage growth and 
inflation. This finding is consistent with the results of the theoretical models that generate 
a smoother response of real wages and inflation when the value of unemployment is set at 
a high level. Besides the benefit replacement rate union density and short term variation in 
bargaining coordination are also important labor market institutions in explaining the volatility in 
inflation. The estimation results have shown that a higher union density generates more volatile 
movements in inflation. Given the fact that union density can be considered as a proxy for the 
workers’ bargaining power this result again supports the findings of the theoretical models 
which show that a higher bargaining power for workers generate more volatile movements 
in inflation. As far as the unemployment is concerned I find that a higher benefit replacement 
rate, a longer duration of unemployment benefits, and a higher union density are expected 
to lead to a higher rate of unemployment. On the other hand stricter employment protection 
regulations and a higher level of coordination during the wage bargaining process are estimated 
to lead to lower levels of unemployment.
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